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Well integrityRecent natural gas development bymeans of hydraulic fracturing requires a detailed risk analysis to eliminate or
mitigate damage to the natural environment. Such geo-energy related subsurface activities involve complex en-
gineering processes and uncertain data, making comprehensive, quantitative risk assessments a challenge to de-
velop. This research seeks to develop a risk framework utilising data for quantitative numerical analysis and
expert knowledge for qualitative analysis in the formof fuzzy logic, focusing on hydraulically fracturedwells dur-
ing the well stimulation stage applied to scenarios in the UK and Canada. New fault trees are developed for
assessing cement failure in the vertical and horizontal directions, resulting in probabilities of failure of 3.42%
and 0.84%, respectively. An overall probability of migration to groundwater during the well injection stage was
determined as 0.0006%, compared with a Canadian case study which considered 0.13% of wells failed during
any stage of the wells life cycle. It incorporates various data types to represent the complexity of hydraulic frac-
turing, encouraging a more complete and accurate analysis of risk failures which engineers can directly apply to
old and new hydraulic fracturing sites without the necessity for extensive historic and probabilistic data. This
framework can be extended to assess risk across all stages of well development, which would lead to a gap in
the modelled and actual probabilities narrowing. The framework developed has relevance to other geo-energy
related subsurface activities such as CO2 sequestration, geothermal, and waste fluid injection disposal.
© 2021 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. This is an open access article under the CC BY license
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).2 6JH, UK.
. Milton-Thompson).
B.V. This is an open access article under the CC BY license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
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Unconventional hydrocarbon resource development, which in-
volves hydraulic fracturing, is a complex engineering process with
many theoretical contributors to environmental risk. These risks might
include water resource contamination, water depletion, fugitive gas
emissions, soil contamination, and human health impacts, many of
which have been documented in the literature (Environment Agency,
2013; Vengosh et al., 2014; Ryan et al., 2015; US Environmental
Protection Agency, 2016). An aspect of the process involves the injec-
tion of fluids at high pressure to fracture low permeability gas-bearing
formations to allow hydrocarbons to flow. This process, known as well
stimulation, has been identified as a factor that may significantly
contribute to loss of well containment and lead to fugitive gasmigration
(Long et al., 2015; Torres et al., 2016). Jackson et al. (2013) and Osborn
et al. (2011) demonstrated methane in 82% of drinking wells was of
thermogenic origin suggesting it was likely from the shale and it
reached shallow water due to casing or cement annulus failures
(Torres et al., 2016). However, studies have disproved this connection
of thermogenicmethane linked directly to shale formationswith papers
criticizing the lack of baseline data to indicate the amount of thermo-
genic methane naturally present in groundwater, regardless of hydrau-
lic fracturing (Davies, 2011; Molofsky et al., 2011; Siegel et al., 2015).
Additional studies also indicated the most common mechanism for
methane reaching groundwater (outside of natural migration) is the
loss of casing and cement integrity (Ingraffea et al., 2014; Jackson
et al., 2014). Unexpected levels of major ions and organic compounds
in shallow drinking wells within close proximity to stimulation wells
have been seen and indicate themigration of stimulation fluids into for-
mations and the loss of zonal isolation during stimulation (Digiulio and
Jackson, 2016; Sun et al., 2019). These casing and cement failures are
most likely to occur during the well stimulation process under extreme
pressures and hence compromising of these barriers during this stage
has been the focus of this paper.
As well stimulation is a subsurface operation, groundwater is at par-
ticular risk for impact from compromisedwell integrity and has been in-
vestigated accordingly (Cahill et al., 2019; Darrah et al., 2014; Davies
et al., 2014; Dusseault and Jackson, 2014; Forde et al., 2019; Humez
et al., 2016; Jabbari et al., 2017; Lackey et al., 2017). General knowledge
of environmental risks associated with well integrity failure scenarios,
including groundwater contamination, have been used to develop
industry best practises and government regulations (Considine et al.,
2013; Dethlefs and Chastain, 2012; Zoback et al., 2010). For example,
the likelihood of water contamination from natural gas production
from the Marcellus shale was previously assessed using probability
bounds analysis supported by various data sources (Rozell and
Reaven, 2012). Here it was found wastewater disposal as a contamina-
tion pathway had the highest risk and uncertainty bounds, with the
next highest uncertainty level in risk beingfluidmigration through frac-
tures. Similarly, Ziemkiewicz et al. (2014) collected data in the field as-
sociated with the Marcellus shale and hydraulic fracturing, focusing on
different risk pathways of contamination of waste fluid containment
and transport. Here it was found flowback, drilling muds, and fluids all
exceeded the desired limits with pits and impoundments presenting
deficiencies in their containment systems, highlighting a high risk con-
cern for potential water contamination. Meanwhile, casing and cement
failure in conventional and unconventional wells in Pennsylvania were
analysed using a historic database created by the state using the Cox
proportional hazards model (Ingraffea et al., 2014). Here it was found
between 1 and 10% of wells demonstrated structural issues within
Pennsylvania and theMarcellus Shalewith themain variances due to lo-
cation, the inspection of records and the time at which a well was
drilled. Post-2009, wells appeared to be at a significantly higher risk in
cement or casing failure in unconventional comparedwith conventional
drilling. Additionally, the current historical database used was not the
best way to determine well integrity violations due to significant2
incomplete data sets. None of the three assessments mentioned above
have focused on the contamination of groundwater and cannot indicate
a clear application to other sites, particularly globally. In addition, data
sets used indicated significant gaps in knowledge, presenting poten-
tially skewed data with no clear method of handling these data gaps.
Certain studies were only feasible with the historic collection of data,
limiting the application of risk analysis to sites which have already ex-
perienced significant problems. This does not allow pre-emptive risk
analysis on new hydraulically fractured sites. Certain models have
worked on quantifying uncertainties to handle significant data gaps
using sensitivity analysis during hydraulic fracturing operations
(Glaser et al., 2016). Although these models demonstrate a comprehen-
sive modelling process of individual risk pathways, only a probabilistic
context has been used which presents many assumptions to the
model without a direct representation of hydraulic fracturing. Compre-
hensive models which perform a more holistic risk analysis on the
water environment are required, to include quantitative and qualitative
factors such as mechanical, human, and social perspectives. There are
very few risk assessment studies which take into account human expe-
rience which can be more valuable than a solely quantitative approach
(Torres et al., 2016).
Risk assessments conducted in the oil and gas industry have taken a
variety of approaches. Torres et al. (2016) discusses the current risk
assessment techniques used in the industry alongwith themost appro-
priate methods to obtain a holistic and integrated risk analysis. Quanti-
tative Risk Assessment (QRA) methods are most common in the oil and
gas industry (Torres et al., 2016). Offshore operations, such as in the UK
and Norway, widely use QRAs (Cai et al., 2013; Skogdalen and Vinnem,
2012; Torbergsen et al., 2012; Yang et al., 2018) introduced as a tech-
nique to support regulatory decisions and safety management systems
(Aven and Kristensen, 2005). Traditionally, QRAs have been used to
quantify risk in the design and operation stages of offshore installations,
particularly for well integrity (Torbergsen et al., 2012; Vignes and
Aadnoy, 2010). They generally require numerical estimates of probabil-
ity and consequence of potential incidents based on engineering evalu-
ation and mathematical techniques (NASA and BSEE, 2017). Detailed
QRAs are seldom used in the oil and gas industry due to a lack of safety
integrity or experience data to perform causal analysis. Consequently,
simpler tools are used which do not support detailed analysis of uncer-
tainty, common cause failures or human reliability (NASA and BSEE,
2017; Torres et al., 2016). Recently, efforts are being made to include
Human and Organizational Factors in QRAs (Aven et al., 2006;
Skogdalen and Vinnem, 2011), and Bayesian network techniques in
the offshore industry (Cai et al., 2013; Khakzad et al., 2013) are used
to support uncertainty in QRAs (Aven and Kristensen, 2005). These
methods could be applied to the onshore industry (Torres et al., 2016).
Departments such as the Environmental Protection Agency, US De-
partment of Energy and the Ministry of Defence conducted Environ-
mental Risk Assessments (ERAs) using a variety of techniques which
include GIS, Environmental Impact Assessments (EIAs), and algorithms
(Torres et al., 2016). ERAs are normally performed with laboratory or
field data andmodels to produce quantitative and qualitative decisions,
particularly framed as the impact human activity has on the environ-
ment (Environment Agency, 2013; Torres et al., 2016). These can be
suitable for producing a detailed holistic overview of the effects of the
engineering technique on the surrounding environment where data is
generally accessible.
Most risk assessments in the oil and gas industry have focused on
safety analysis and risk reduction at offshore operations (Aven et al.,
2007; Chen and Fu, 2003; Khakzad et al., 2013; Skogdalen and
Vinnem, 2012; Vignes and Aadnoy, 2010; Vrålstad et al., 2019), which
present a different set of risks to onshore and even to unconventional
versus conventional oil and gas development. There is a requirement
for assessing a new set of riskswhich offshore risk assessments are lack-
ing and this could be best tackled using a variety of risk assessment
methodologies.
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cessfully used in the offshore oil and gas industry (Hu et al., 2012;
Lavasani et al., 2011; Liu et al., 2013) and other fields of research
(Ahmadi et al., 2016; Lavasani et al., 2015; Mirzaei et al., 2015; Sadiq
and Rodriguez, 2004) to mitigate problems associated with conven-
tional probabilistic risk analysis (i.e. when there is a lack of data to quan-
tify the failure of components or individual contamination pathways).
Here, fuzzy set theory allows the evaluation of risk using multiple
types of information such as linguistic data, expert opinions, and prob-
abilistic data to quantify pathways which are often ignored due to a
lack of data. For example, studies have focused on physical equipment
failure, operational risks, and some human intervention (Hu et al.,
2012; Liu et al., 2013). A recent study has used fuzzy methods to evalu-
ate the risk of seismic hazards during hydraulic fracturing operations
which has taken into account huge rawdata sets and expert assessment
and opinion (Hu et al., 2018). The fuzzy comprehensive evaluation
method used has allowed the authors to evaluate complicated influenc-
ing factors which would otherwise require complex numerical models
with significant assumptions. Additionally, themodel has demonstrated
a successful application to a site in China and although some subjectivity
exists in the expert assessment, themodel demonstrated stability under
sensitivity analysis. However, to date fuzzy set theory has not broken
down more complex ideas such as cement failures or location of leaks
in the context of petroleum well integrity, despite significant potential
to provide insights for risk assessment.
Onshore risk assessments for unconventional gas development have
beendeveloped recently as quantitative or qualitative studies. However,
successful quantitative studies lack a generic approach with many only
focusing on the Marcellus Shale, or particularly large shale resources in
North America with already heavy exploitation. Future onshore devel-
opments cannot be easily assessed prior to drilling. Additionally, specific
stages during hydraulic fracturing are not considered as individual risk
events even though each stage brings with it different magnitudes of
risk. Groundwater contamination is a well-known concern in the on-
shore industry but is often poorly quantified andonly site specific. Alter-
native methods need to be used to develop a risk assessment for
onshore development which can be applied to more than one area
and which focuses on independent stages of hydraulic fracturing to as-
sess specifically where high risks to groundwater might lie.
The aimof this research is to apply fuzzy logic techniques to onshore,
hydraulically fractured wells during the high-pressure well injection
stage; an aspect commonly neglected due to its short, limited duration.
Event Tree Analysis (ETA) and Fuzzy Fault Tree Analysis (FFTA) are
adopted in this paper to develop a quantitative risk assessment frame-
work. The novel features of this research include developing an event
tree for a generic hydraulically fractured well, developing fault trees,
and using FFTA to quantitatively analyse cement failure and comparing
probabilistic and fuzzy fault tree methods to support this approach.
The framework developed which combines ETA and FFTA has been
applied to a case study in British Columbia (BC), Canada; a region of his-
toric and extensive conventional and unconventional onshore develop-
ment, hosting approximately 25,000 energy wells for which 0.6% have
been identified as exhibiting gas migration (Cahill et al., 2019). Subse-
quently, the Canadian context is compared with a hypothetical case
study in the UK, where there is a potential future for the industry, to
obtain intuitive outcomes for the probability of groundwater contami-
nation due to gas migration from well integrity failure during well
stimulation.
2. Risk assessment methodology
The focus of this research is on the pathways which can lead to
groundwater contamination during the well stimulation stage of high-
volume hydraulic fracturing, focusing on horizontal wells drilled into
shale formations. In this paper, where /stage is defined as a unit of prob-
ability, this is always referred to as the injection stage; it can be read as3
“per injection stage” for clarification. Conceptualmodels are required to
understand the barriers preventing migration and are used to under-
stand the potential pathways by which gas could reach aquifers. Event
trees are then developed using the source of the leak as the initiating
event. Subsequent failure events involvewell component failureswhilst
considering geological surroundings. These pathways and conceptual
models have been developed from literature analysis, industry data
and expert discussion.
2.1. Conceptual models
Various incidences of gas or fluid migration into groundwater or the
atmosphere have been reported in the US and Canada over the last
50 years with significant variation in incidence rate (Bachu, 2017;
Jackson et al., 2013; Lackey et al., 2017). To understand these variations
in probability of gas migration occurrence, two conceptual models for a
well stimulation event have been developed (Fig. 1); 1) A case study of a
leaking onshore well from BC in Canada (Fig. 1a) and, 2) a hypothetical
well construction often used offshore in the UK industry and in some
states in the US (Fig. 1b).
Both conceptual models involve two sets of casings (a surface and
production casing) and fully cemented annuli to the surface. The num-
ber of casings, depths or heights of the casings, and amount of cement
used varies based on local regulations, the age of the well, geological
surroundings, economic constraints, and engineering considerations.
The three geological zones identified in Fig. 1 are implemented to
distinguish between three different locations where a leak could occur
from the external well casing to a formation to produce a different out-
come. It is expected that during well stimulation the pressure will be
much greater inside the wellbore compared to the surroundings.
Stimulation pressures for the case study well (Fig. 1a) range from
about 57,000–62,000 kPa and the initial reservoir pressure is around
45,000 kPa. As a general assumption, fluids and gases will only move
where there is a pressure gradient from a region of high-pressure to
low-pressure. Additionally, in this paper the wellbore pressure at a cer-
tain depth x is defined as the well injection pressure at the surface plus
the hydrostatic pressure at the same depth x. Geological zone A is de-
fined as a lower pressure formation compared to the wellbore pressure
at the same depth, zone B is defined as a higher pressure formation rel-
ative to zone A encouraging vertical migration rather than horizontal,
and zone C is defined as a shallow lower pressure formation compared
to the wellbore pressure at the same depth (similar to A) where a use-
able aquifer is potentially present. Table 1 exhibits the properties each
of these zones might take.
Scenario 1 uses a specific case study fromBC, Canadawhich has been
applied for the purposes of developing a fuzzy logic risk assessment
based on an example well located in the Montney resource play of NE
BC, Canada (Fig. 1a). Gas migration has been reported to the regulator
(BC Oil and Gas Commission; BCOGC) at this well based on field obser-
vations at the ground surface around thewellhead. As the leakwas seen
close to the wellhead, it can be assumed this was due to gas migration
along a casing as opposed to fracture propagation or fracture connection
through underlying strata. However, the underlying cause(s) of gas mi-
gration at this well have not been investigated as part of this research.
Nonetheless, the case study has been used as a realistic starting point
for model development. Additionally, the presence or characteristics of
any aquifer systems around or intersected by this well have not been
confirmed but may still exist (Cahill et al., 2019; Hickin et al., 2008).
This paper focuses on shallow groundwater contamination and there-
fore a shallow aquifer is conceptualized within the confines of the sur-
face casing and surface casing cement (Fig. 1a, geological zone C). As
the gasmigrationwas recognised at the surface it is possible thatmigrat-
ing gas is passing through or into a potential shallow aquifer system.
In terms of subsurface gas source zones, as well as the Montney for-
mation, theDoig andPhosphate intersecting thewell are considered sec-
ondary targets for gas production andwill represent over-pressured gas
Fig. 1. Conceptual models of two different well constructions for a stimulated hydraulically fracturedwell. The letters correspond to different geological zoneswhich have an effect on the
pathways of contamination; A) non-gas bearing, permeable formation, B) gas-bearing, higher pressure formation (relative to zone A), and C) shallow region with a potentially useable
aquifer. a. Scenario 1: A hydraulically fractured well in BC, Canada where injection occurs down the production casing. The Montney Formation is the target shale being fracked and
the well has evidence of gas migration at the surface. b. Scenario 2: A potential UK well construction diagram (or sometimes seen in North America) where injection occurs down the
production tubing and a packer is used to hold the tubing in place and create a pressurized annulus as an added barrier.
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intersecting the well, the Artex and Halfway, are sampled as containing
gas but of fairly poor shows but could also represent an over-pressured
gas formation with respect to the target formation. Between the Artex
and Harmon lie approximately 1000 m of various formations mainly
consisting of sandstone, shale, siltstone, and dolomite. These are taken
as being mixed porosities and permeabilities with no gas shows but are
inferred to contain formation fluids. This geological structure is common
in sedimentary basins allowing for amore generic case study application.
Fig. 1a indicates a multi-stage frac has occurred with the use of
bridge plugs in order to frac ten different sections of the horizontal
well production casing. This is also indicated in scenario 2 (Fig. 1b)
but without the addition of the bridge plugs, for simplicity.
2.2. Event tree development
Two event trees were developed using contamination pathways
from both conceptual models. A main source of fugitive gas duringTable 1





A Formation pressure < wellbore
pressure at same depth
Mixed porosities and permeabilities.
Rock type: e.g. sandstone/siltstone.
Contains formation fluids e.g.
saline water.
B Formation
pressure > formation pressure
at zone A
Tight porosity and low permeability.
Gas present but unlikely
economically viable.
Over-pressured due to gas and
hydrostatic pressure.
C Useable groundwater zone
Formation pressure < wellbore
pressure at same depth
Potentially high permeability and
high porosity aquifer zone.
Rock type: e.g. limestone/sandstone.
Potable or slightly brackish water
for anthropogenic use.
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well stimulation is from inside the wellbore to geological surroundings
due to well integrity failure. Well integrity failure leading to groundwa-
ter contamination is the primary concern in this research where well
barrier failure is the failure of individual or multiple barriers eventually
leading to integrity failure (Davies et al., 2014). The initiating event for
the event trees is the primary barrier failing as it directly experiences
very high injection pressures. This will either be the production casing
for Fig. 1a or the packer or tubing for Fig. 1b. The corresponding event
trees for these two scenarios are indicated in Fig. 2.
In between the initiating event and outcome, events are developed
based on barrier failures in the well and the difference in pressure gra-
dients leading to each consecutive event. Table 2 gives details of each
event in the event trees.
2.3. Event tree analysis
As detailed in Table 2, each individual event is quantified using dif-
ferent methods to obtain individual probabilities. These are quantified
using either quantitative industry probability failures or, where proba-
bility failures are not possible to obtain, fault trees are constructed to ob-
tain simpler basic events. These basic events are quantified using either
quantitative industry and literature values, or qualitative expert judge-
ment. Fuzzy logic analysis is applied in the case of expert judgement
(known as FFTA) and discussed further in Section 2.6.
Using ETA, individual probabilities are multiplied along the event
tree branches to determine a probability of groundwater contamination
for each failure outcome. Both scenario 1 and scenario 2 demonstrate
three individual failure outcomes which are evaluated independently.
2.3.1. Industry probability failures
Events 1, 3, and 6 are quantified using industry probability failures
(Table 2). Probability failures for components of a well are obtained
from the WellMaster database which contains failure data for offshore
oil and gas well components, or the literature (Rish, 2005). The review
conducted for this study indicated that easily accessible databases that
include specific attributes pertaining to probability failures of well com-
ponents, including cement, are limited to offshore wells, and similar
a. Scenario 1: Production casing leak event tree.
b. Scenario 2: Tubing or packer leak event tree.
Fig. 2. Two event trees for gas leakage into groundwater during well stimulation. The probability of failure outcomes are defined as Px(y) where x is scenario 1 or scenario 2, and y is
outcome 1, 2 or 3. a. Scenario 1: Production casing leak event tree. b. Scenario 2: Tubing or packer leak event tree.
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Table 2
Details of individual eventswithin both event trees including how their probabilities are quantified. FP= Formation Pressure,WP=Wellbore Pressure. *The database used to gatherwell
component failures indicated no failures occurred over experiment times for surface casings. Therefore, themedian probability failure value was taken from Rish (2005)where it was cal-
culated used a Poisson probability distribution.
Event/barrier failure Scenario Description Quantitative probabilities
Event 1
Packer or tubing failure
2 • Initiating event in scenario 2 (Fig. 1b) Industry values (Appendix A; Table A.1)
Event 2
Annulus failure
2 • Pressurized annulus between production tubing and casing.
• Failure when pressurized annulus < injection pressure.
FFTA (probabilistic and fuzzy, Sections 2.5 and 2.6)
Event 3
Production casing failure
1 and 2 • Initiating event in scenario 1 (Fig. 1a) Industry values (Appendix A; Table A.1)
Event 4
Pressure difference
1 and 2 • Determines direction of gas migration.
• FP < WP, gas migration to outside.
• FP < WP, vertical migration upwards to surface or region of lower pressure.
Event 5
Production casing cement failure
1 and 2 • Barrier to support production casing.




1 and 2 • Second casing barrier to protect groundwater. *Industry values (Appendix A; Table A.1)
Event 7
Surface casing cement failure
1 and 2 • Barrier to support surface casing.
• Failures in the cement can occur in either the horizontal or vertical direction.
FFTA (Section 2.6)
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searches. Therefore, it is assumed for this study the offshore probability
failures are similar to onshore failure rates as well construction is very
similar whether onshore or offshore (The Institute of Materials
Minerals and Mining, 2016). Where more accurate failure rates are ob-
tained, event tree calculations can be updated. The data for the well
components used in this paper and the explanation for obtaining the
failure rates are detailed in Appendix A.
2.4. Fault tree development
Three fault trees have been developed to allow quantification of
events 2, 5, and 7 (Table 2)which requiremore detailed analysis. The dif-
ference in pressure between the annulus andwellhead injection pressure
(event 2) is quantified using a fault tree developed by Rish (2005) and is
shown in Fig. 3, with an explanation for reading fault trees in Appendix B.Fig. 3. Fault tree for the breach of the pressurized annulus when the wel
6
Two new fault trees are constructed in this paper for cement failure
with the top event being either production of horizontal pathways in
the cement (Fig. 4a) or production of vertical pathways (Fig. 4b). These
fault trees were developed from a literature analysis (Bonett and
Pafitis, 1996; Brufatto et al., 2003; Dusseault et al., 2000) and discussed
with academic and industry experts within Canada and the UK. These
fault trees are developed based on some subjectivity and therefore can
be adjusted where reasonable explanations and evidence have been
given. The explanation for these fault trees is presented below.
Failure pathways in cementwere considered to occur horizontally or
vertically. Horizontal failures could develop either over time from exter-
nal stresses and interactions, or due to poor initial construction and
placement which leads to fractures and channels developing as the ce-
ment sets (Bonett and Pafitis, 1996). Premature gelation involves a sud-
den increase in cement viscosity quicker than expected (Frigaard,
2018). This can lead to a loss of hydrostatic pressure control, openinglhead injection pressure exceeds the annulus pressure (Rish, 2005).
a. Horizontal cement pathways.
b. Vertical cement pathways.
Fig. 4. Fault trees for the development of pathways causing a failure in the cement. a. Horizontal cement pathways. b. Vertical cement pathways.
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placement, if fluid densities are too high there is a risk of losing cement
slurry into the surrounding formation causing a loss of circulation
within the borehole or fracturing of a rock interval (Bonett and Pafitis,
1996). A loss of cement could open up horizontal channels in the ce-
ment before it has set.
Vertical pathways in the cement can also develop from external
stresses (Stormont et al., 2015) and interactions or poor cement design,
leading to high permeability pathways allowing gas tomigrate upwards
(Dusseault et al., 2000; Stormont et al., 2018). Additionally, vertical frac-
tures and channels can be developed from poor construction and place-
ment through slightly different mechanisms. A low density slurry
during cementing can lead to poor hydrostatic imbalances and vertical7
pathways. If mud during drilling is not removed properly, gas channels
can develop between the cement sheath and rock formations or casings
(Dusseault et al., 2000; Frigaard, 2018). Similarly, poor bonding of the
cement can lead to channels between the cement-casing or cement-
formation interfaces (Bonett and Pafitis, 1996; Stormont et al., 2015).
During the cement setting process, fluid is lost but if this occurs too
quickly or too much, the volume of the cement is reduced significantly
to open up available space for gas to enter (Frigaard, 2018).
2.5. Fault tree analysis
Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) requires quantification of the basic events
created during fault tree development. This refers to basic events Pr1-
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ther information on generic FTA and an understanding on Minimal Cut
Sets (MCS) in FTA. In conventional FTA, the basic events are determined
using industry and literature data. The pressure fault tree (Fig. 3) can be
quantified using industry data as this data does exist for all the basic
events. The top event was calculated by Rish (2005) as 6.48E−11/day
using probabilistic distributions. Further information on this fault tree
and the distributions used are detailed in Appendix B.
2.6. Fuzzy fault tree analysis
Where quantitative data cannot be obtained to quantify event tree
branches or fault tree basic events, qualitative information is used in
the formof linguistic descriptors. Both fault trees in Fig. 4 require expert
judgement to calculate the basic events as there is no industry data due
to the subjective and ambiguous nature of cement failure. As linguistic
descriptors are used instead of probabilistic values, the basic events in
this case are considered fuzzy. Therefore, FFTA is required to quantify
both cement fault trees. This involves the Similarity Aggregation Meth-
odology (SAM) (Appendix C) to aggregate each opinion and numeri-
cally evaluate the basic events. Additionally, the pressure fault tree
(Fig. 3) was analysed using FFTA in this research as well as FTA to com-
pare the difference between a probabilisticmethod and a fuzzymethod.
2.6.1. Linguistic probability levels
The linguistic terms are defined based on the probability of occur-
rence during the individual stage of the well. Experts from the UK and
Canada independently populate each basic event for all three fault
trees with a qualitative descriptor, using their expert judgement. Fur-
ther information on the linguistic terms used in this research and their
relationship to fuzzy membership functions is given in Appendix D.
2.6.2. Expert opinion elicitation
The opinions of experts using qualitative, linguistic information are
employed to obtain information on the basic events of the three fault
trees discussed in this paper. Experts with the required skill set give
their own judgement on individual basic events. These judgements
will vary depending on their background so a weighting system is
used to account for these variations in decision-making. Theweightings
are calculated based on professional or academic title, length of time in
profession, education level, and age, as indicated in Table 3. It is ex-
pected as an expert becomes older and increases their time in their pro-
fession, they will becomemore experienced. Hence, as service time andTable 3
Weighting attributes for experts.
Category Classification Weight










Education level PhD 5
Masters 4
Bachelors 3
Higher National Diploma 2
School level 1






age increases so does their weighting. Equally, it is assumed as one
spends more time in education understanding the technicalities and
scientific understanding of cement failure, they have amore specific un-
derstanding compared with those with a broader knowledge in indus-
try. Therefore, as education level is advanced and your academic title
is increased, so does the weighting. However, if certain weightings are
deemed incorrect for a specific analysis, these can be altered easily
with sufficient reasoning. Appendix D details the calculated weightings
of the experts used in this research.
2.6.3. Similarity aggregation methodology
Once each basic event has been populatedwith linguistic descriptors
converted into fuzzy numbers, aggregation of the basic events is con-
ducted using SAM, developed by Hsu and Chen (1996). This method is
detailed in Appendix C. Aggregating expert opinions outputs a Fuzzy
Possibility Score (FPS) rather than a fuzzy probability score. It is imprac-
tical to expect an expert to directly determine the probability of failure
so terminology such as the possibility of occurrence of a basic event is
used (Lin and Wang, 1997).
After aggregation using SAM, defuzzification is used to convert fuzzy
values to a crisp possibility output using the centroid defuzzification
technique. The defuzzified possibility values are finally converted to
probabilities failures using a method developed by Onisawa (1988).
These are both detailed in Appendix C.
2.6.4. Sensitivity analysis
FFTA provides a probability of the top event, but there is still a need
to evaluate the effects each component has on the system. It is important
to understand the contribution each basic event has to the top event.
Sensitivity analysis can help decide the weakest components and the
improvements to bemade (Zhou et al., 2015). In this paper, three impor-
tancemeasures are used to understand the system. The FuzzyWeighted
Index (FWI) is used to determine the contribution each basic event has
to the overall system to investigate alternatives or improvements. Prob-
abilistic importance (Birnbaum's structural importance) is the “proba-
bility that the system is in a state where a particular component is
critical” (Cobo, 1996). Criticality importance is the “probability that
event i has occurred and is critical to system failure” (Cobo, 1996). A de-
tailed description of these can be found in Appendix B.
In addition, a sensitivity analysis was conducted on the fuzzy logic
model to demonstrate the sensitivity of the outcomes with respect to
the input expert opinions in order to demonstrate the robustness of
the approach and where variability might lie within the model. A com-
prehensive adjustment of the expert opinions was conducted by vary-
ing the expert inputs by +/-1 fuzzy membership level input. For
example, where an expert gave an opinion of ‘low’, the input was ad-
justed to ‘very low’ and ‘medium’, accounting for an upper bound sensi-
tivity (‘medium’) and a lower bound sensitivity (‘very low’). This was
conducted under three scenarios, looking at all possibilities of changing:
1) one expert opinion per fault tree, 2) two expert opinions per fault
tree, and 3) three expert opinions per fault tree. Table 4 demonstratesTable 4
Number of simulations run under three different sensitivity analysis scenarios.




Horizontal cement 1 60 25
2 3480 2920
3 194,880 149,460
Vertical cement 1 80 37
2 6240 5778
3 474,241 422,250
Pressure 1 80 31
2 6240 4908
3 474,241 330,096
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ferent scenarios for each fault tree. Under some circumstances, the fuzzy
membership input could not be adjusted if it was already at its lowest or
highest level. The outputs where this occurred were removed from the
sensitivity analysis with the actual number of simulations shown in
Table 4. Additionally, a brief analysis of the agreement between expert
opinions was conducted on the current data set as another form of sen-
sitivity to indicate how much expert opinions might vary.
3. Results and discussion
3.1. Fuzzy fault tree analysis results
An understanding of potential gas migration through well integrity
failure in two different well construction scenarios is analysed using
ETA and FFTA. FFTA is used to quantify events 2, 5, and 7 (Table 2)
where linguistic terminology (Appendix D) is used by experts to popu-
late each basic event in the fault trees. In this research study, seven ex-
perts in total were used; their calculated weightings are detailed in
Appendix D. Three of the experts are academics working specifically
in the area of cementing practises in deep horizontal wells. Four experts
are industry-based engineers or geologistsworking in the oil and gas in-
dustry, managing engineers. The pressure fault tree requires expert
knowledge in understanding how pressures can change during well
stimulation. Two out of the original five experts with extensive drilling
engineering knowledgewere used for this fault tree and twomorewere
contacted for a complete analysis of the pressure fault tree. The cement
fault trees required expert knowledge in cementing practises which
was the research focus of the three experts working in academia and
both original engineers have extensive knowledge in this area.
Final results for all three fault trees are obtained using the SAM (Ap-
pendix C) where expert opinions are aggregated, defuzzified, and then
converted into probability failures. Details of the FFTA results for each
basic event are given in Appendix E and the overall top event probabil-
ities for horizontal cement PHC (TE), vertical cement PVC (TE), and annu-
lus pressure PPr (TE) are 8.36E−3/stage, 3.42E−2/stage, and 1.29E−9/
stage, respectively.Fig. 5. Sensitivity of each basic event in the pressure and cement fault
9
Validating the top event of the cement fault trees is a challenge as
very little exists on alternative methods for quantifying cement failure.
Cement failure is well detected during drilling and injection but proba-
bility of failure is often unknown (Calosa et al., 2010; Considine et al.,
2013). However, incidences of gas migration indicate vertical cement
failure is more likely than horizontal cement failure (Dusseault et al.,
2000). The results in this paper indicate the cement tree top event for
vertical failure is 10 times more likely than horizontal failure.
Vertical cement migration has been quantified in some instances in
previous literature. An example used here is comparing itwith a Poisson
distribution conducted by Rish (2005). The outputs showed a median
value of 6.00E−6/day (2.40E−5/stage) with a lower and upper bound
of 2.00E−6/day (8.00E−6/stage) and 1.00E−5/day (4.00E−5/stage),
respectively. Using expert opinions, vertical cement migration has
been quantified using FFTA and the outputs showed a value of 3.42E
−2/stage, a probability > 1000 times more likely than indicated by
Rish (2005). There is no indication of further research conducted to
quantify the failures of cement during oil and gas drilling and therefore
little data is available to support or refute these methods. However, the
fuzzy fault tree values have been supported by expert opinion, a part of
validation of the method using industry knowledge. The horizontal ce-
ment fault tree failure probability was calculated as 8.36E−3/stage
but there is no information to compare this value to. FFTA can be a
new method for dealing with these gaps in the industry.
3.1.1. FFTA sensitivity analysis
The first stage of the sensitivity analysis focuses on the specific im-
pact of the individual basic events of each fault tree on the overall top
event of each fault tree. In Fig. 5, each basic event for each fault tree is
plotted according to its failure probability and FWI. This demonstrates
for failure probability, loss of injection capacity, Pr8, is the biggest con-
tributor to the top event failure probability for annulus pressure. H4,
premature gelation and V8, poor mud removal, are the biggest contrib-
utors to the top event failure probability for horizontal and vertical ce-
ment failure, respectively.
The FWI follows a similar pattern to the failure probability in most
cases (Fig. 5) but determines to what degree the top event is improvedtrees with respect to failure probability and fuzzy weighted index.
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trees, H4 and V8 are still considered to have the highest impact on the
top event probability. Removing both will have a significant improve-
ment on the top event probability.
Reducing the risk of premature gelation during the cementing pro-
cess is important to reduce the effect of basic event H4 on the top
event. Gelation is the process in cement setting at which it begins to so-
lidify. If the cement sets too early this can lead to a loss of hydrostatic
pressure control in the well and gas or formation fluids can enter the ce-
ment annulus leading to horizontal channels (Bonett and Pafitis, 1996).
Methods to improve this can involve improved designs of the cementing
process such as using casing centralizers or improved cementing mix-
tures (US Environmental Protection Agency, 2016).
Reducing the risk of poor mud removal during drilling is important
to reduce the effect of basic event V8 on the top event. Mud removal oc-
curs during the drilling process when cement is used to displace the
mud from the borehole. It is vital mud channels are eliminated other-
wise lower yield stresses of drilling fluids could cause preferential path-
ways for gas migration, or water could be drawn from themud into the
cement when the two come in contact. This can shrink and dry out the
mud, opening up vertical pathways along the annulus for gas to flow.
Successful mud removal depends on factors such as downhole condi-
tions, borehole characteristics, fluid rheology, and displacement design
along with optimal fluid displacement (Brufatto et al., 2003). These fac-
tors must be carefully calculated to reduce the risk of vertical cement
failure.
Although Pr8 is considered to have thehighest contribution to the top
event according to failure probability, Pr3, check valve fails, and Pr5, op-
erator errorwhen under pressure are both considered themost sensitive
to the FWI and therefore removing these errors in operation will im-
prove the top event probability on the annulus pressure fault tree.
According to Fig. 6, the probabilistic importance and criticality im-
portance values for basic events Pr9 and Pr10 aremuch higher compared
with the others, indicating if either of these components fail, the system
will fail (Cobo, 1996). Therefore, it is vital to ensure the auto alarm sys-
tem for detecting a pressure difference is tested frequently (Pr9) and op-
erators are aware of potential errors in their practice (Pr10).
Elements of the pressure fault tree could require improvement for a
more realistic situation during pressure control. It was suggested theFig. 6. Sensitivity of each basic event in the pressure fault tree with
10control system failure basic events Pr4 and Pr6 could occur, but in reality
would unlikely lead directly to an under pressurized or over pressurized
system. If this occurrence was recognised, the sand would be flushed
from the systemand fracturingwould stop, eliminating the failure prob-
ability altogether.
The second stage of the sensitivity analysis was conducted on the
model framework to determine the effect of varying expert inputs on
the individual fault trees and hence the overall risk output. Three
models were run where the expert inputs were varied under scenarios
1, 2, and 3 with the outputs shown in Figs. 7, 8, and 9, respectively. The
adjustments made to the expert inputs by +/-1 fuzzy membership
function were to account for potential human error or variation in
human judgement; a likely cause of varying results when using fuzzy
logic methods. If the human was an expert in the field (which is a re-
quirement for the model), it is unlikely they would have made an
error in judgement by much more than +/-1 linguistic term.
In scenario 1 (Fig. 7), the tornado diagrams indicate both cement
fault trees show a variation in the output by only +/-20%, where 50%
of the combinations are within an error of only +/-5%. This is not a sig-
nificant change to the overall top event output but indicates the error on
the cement fault trees could be within +/-20%. In correlation with the
sensitivity analysis conducted on the fault trees, it is evident from
Fig. 7 that basic events H4 and V8 are the most sensitive to changes in
human inputs. The annulus pressure demonstrates a much larger sensi-
tivity with events Pr9 and Pr10 (also most sensitive in the previous anal-
ysis) showing up to 150% variability. This outcome would shift the top
failure event of the pressure fault tree from 1.29E−9/stage to 3.2E−9/
stage. Although the error appears large, due to the very low probability
of the top event failing this error has a very small impact on the overall
model.
Histograms were developed in the two scenarios where more than
one variable was changed i.e. where at least two expert opinions were
changed per fault tree (Figs. 8 and 9). This allowed a visual representa-
tion of the population of combinations at varying sensitivities. Under
both scenarios, the majority of combinations obtained an output be-
tween ±50% for the annulus pressure fault tree and between ±20%
for the cement trees, indicating a similar sensitivity as demonstrated
by the tornado plots. Increasing the number of changes made has not
had a big impact on the sensitivity of the model but has increased therespect to probabilistic importance and criticality importance.
Fig. 7. Tornado diagrams indicating the sensitivity of changing one expert opinion per fault tree (scenario 1). LB: lower bound, UB: upper bound, Prx: basic event, Ey: expert opinion.
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been a few combinations which increased the error of the top event,
particularly in the annulus pressure fault tree. A few combinations (12
out of 330,096) increased the error by over 900% which increases the
top event probability from 1.29E−9 to 1.3E−8. This will affect the over-
all system by 10 times the original assessment. However, as discussedFig. 8. Histograms indicating the sensitivity of changin
11earlier the outcomeprobability of the system is still extremely small, de-
spite these rare occurrences of high errors.
The larger variabilities in sensitivity which can be seen from Figs. 7,
8, and 9 indicates a concern if different experts were chosenwith differ-
ing opinions. Due to the challenge in obtaining a new set of experts in
this niche field of study, this was unable to be tested to see how muchg two expert opinions per fault tree (scenario 2).
Fig. 9. Histograms indicating the sensitivity of changing three expert opinions per fault tree (scenario 3).
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used in this study can be obtained to indicate how much variability
might exist between experts who are completely unrelated. In this
study, all experts were anonymous, living in different countries and
were unaware of each other's input. The agreement between the ex-
perts is conducted from the SAM, detailed in Appendix C, Eq. C.3. The
output from this agreement calculation is shown in Appendix E but
the overall average agreement for each expert used in this study is
shown in Table 5. The closer the value is to 1, the higher the agreement
between each expert. Table 5 indicates most experts have a strong
agreement across all basic events within each fault tree, with expert 1
averaging the lowest agreement in the vertical cement tree, expert 2
in the horizontal cement tree and expert 5 averaging the lowest agree-
ment in the pressure tree.
An analysis of the expert agreements for each basic event (Table E.1)
indicatesH6, V2 and Pr8 demonstrate the lowest agreement between ex-
perts. This suggests there could be more variability in expert inputs
within these three events. As demonstrated by earlier sensitivity analy-
sis and Fig. 7, all three of these basic events are not highly sensitive to
change and therefore even with expert variability, this would not alter
the result significantly.
3.1.2. Comparison of fuzzy versus probabilistic
An important element of this paper is to demonstrate the viabil-
ity of using fuzzy logic methods where alternative probabilistic
methods are not appropriate. Probabilistic FTA was conducted for
the annulus pressure fault tree using uniform, triangular, and
Poisson distributions (Rish, 2005), and a top event failure value of
6.48E−11/day (2.59E−10/stage) was obtained. Using FFTA, a
value of 1.29E−9/stage was obtained, as discussed in Section 3.1.
Both methods indicate a similarly low probability value for well-
head injection pressure exceeding annulus pressure, supporting
the fuzzy logic methodology.
However, despite similar magnitudes the fuzzy method calculates a
top event failure 5 times more likely than the probabilistic method.
Analysing the failure probabilities of individual basic events helps12understand these differences and where each method might represent
a more realistic output (Table 6).
Fuzzy logic applications are suitablewhere humanerrormight be in-
volved. Basic events Pr5, Pr7, and Pr10 all involve an operator error. Prob-
abilistically, human error was evaluated using a uniform distribution
(Rish, 2005) based on work conducted by Swain (1987) so all human-
related procedures had the same probability of failure based on the
same distribution. In reality, human errors vary depending on the situ-
ation. The fuzzymethod accounts for human errors based on real life ex-
periences working specifically on hydraulically fractured wells. Each
operator error leading to a different outcome used individual expert
knowledge and will therefore have a more realistic probability output.
Results in Table 6 indicate a difference in probability for all three oper-
ational error basic events (Pr5, Pr7, Pr10).
The basic event Pr1, a sudden ormajor long string casing leak, shows
the largest difference of magnitude 100 which might affect the overall
top event. This basic event is a technical failure andmight be best repre-
sented as a probabilistic value if there was enough data to indicate the
failure rate of the component for specific hydraulically fractured wells.
However, the failure probability and FWI of this basic event is ranked
lowest according to Fig. 5a indicating it has the lowest contribution to
the overall system, and is not highly sensitive compared with other
basic events as demonstrated by Fig. 7 and therefore not as important
to the top event probability.
The fuzzy probability method has demonstrated uncertainty
based on expert inputs as demonstrated by the sensitivity analysis
conducted in Section 3.1.1, especially for the pressure fault tree. Al-
though the fuzzy method is better at handling human opinion, the
potentially larger errors could lead to a significantly different result.
This sensitivity might affect a choice between using fuzzy or probabi-
listic methods. Where a large number of top experts with extensive
knowledge can be used for the analysis, the fuzzy method would be
preferable, particularly where human errors need to be quantified
based on real experiences. However, if there are not enough experts
to provide unbiased opinions, the probabilistic method could be
more appropriate.
Table 5
The average agreement for each expert for each fault tree. The highlighted cells are those with the lowest agree-
ment within that fault tree.
Ex1 Ex2 Ex3 Ex4 Ex5 Ex6 Ex7
Pressure 
fault tree
- 0.84 - - 0.77 0.80 0.80
Horizontal 
cement
0.86 0.85 0.87 0.87 0.88 - -
Vertical 
cement
0.76 0.85 0.81 0.84 0.80 - -
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The probability failures obtained from FFTA are applied to the event
trees constructed in Section 2.2 to conduct ETA and to determine a final
probability for gas migration during well integrity failure. The failure
probability values for both event trees have been calculated based on
the probabilistic and fuzzy inputs to the model, shown in Appendix E;
Table E.2.
Two different scenarios were used based on a Canadian case study
(Fig. 1a) and a likely UK well construction (Fig. 1b). Both scenarios
have been assessed using fuzzy inputs calculated in this paper and prob-
abilistic inputs calculated from Rish (2005). In both scenarios the user
inputs the formation pressure and wellbore pressure in MPa of where
the leaks could occur and for scenario 2, the user must input whether
a packer or tubing has failed.
Different output values are obtained based on the well construction
scenario and the location at which the leak has occurred (Table 7). P
(1) indicates a leak at geological zone A, P(2) at geological zone B, and
P(3) at geological zone C.
The ETA has been conducted using fuzzymethods as described in this
paper and compared against probabilistic values for similar leaks on
waste injection wells (Rish, 2005). Rish (2005) developed probabilistic
values for the FTA and ETA and therefore took more assumptions for
ease of calculation. The failure of cement in the horizontal direction was
not considered by Rish (2005) and therefore has been neglected in the
probabilistic calculations. In this study, horizontal and vertical failure of
cement were quantified using FFTA for a more accurate representation.Table 6
Comparison between probabilistic calculated values and fuzzy logic values for each basic









Pr1 1.13E−4 3.00E−7 1.20E−6
Pr2 1.61E−3 5.00E−4 2.00E−3
Pr3 9.12E−4 3.00E−4 1.20E−3
Pr4 6.77E−4 1.00E−5 4.00E−5
Pr5 8.80E−4 3.00E−4 1.20E−3
Pr6 2.82E−4 1.00E−5 4.00E−5
Pr7 1.44E−3 3.00E−4 1.20E−3
Pr8 1.95E−3 1.00E−4 4.00E−4
Pr9 2.27E−4 3.00E−4 1.20E−3
Pr10 1.07E−3 3.00E−4 1.20E−3
P (TE) 1.29E−9 6.48E−11 2.59E−10
13The significant difference between the probabilistic calculations from
Rish (2005) and this researchwas the horizontal cement failure. By con-
sidering the movement of fluids or gases horizontally, the probability of
failure will decrease as the cement is acting as a barrier. Despite this dif-
ference, the probability values are similar for all three events across both
methods. This will be due to the differences in the probabilistic failure
rates of certain components compared to the industry values. Generally,
the industry values have higher failure rates than those calculated using
probabilistic distributions.
The comparison of results in Table 7 involves the application of prob-
abilistic failure rates from Rish (2005) to the conceptual models (sce-
narios 1 and 2) developed in this paper. However, probability failures
for the breach of class 1 waste injection wells were calculated by Rish
(2005) where a leak above a confining zone can be compared against
a leak in geological zone a (pathway P(1)) in this paper. The values cal-
culated byRish (2005) are compared against the fuzzy outputs from this
paper. A major packer or injection tube failure where the hydrostatic
annulus is breached immediately can be loosely compared against sce-
nario 1 in this research. The waste injection well gave a failure of ap-
proximately 1.0E−8 and the hydraulically fractured stimulation well a
failure of 6.4E−6. Similarly, a packer leak event or a tubing leak event
can be compared against scenario 2 in this research. Thewaste injection
well gave a packer leak or an injection tube leak of 1.0E−17 and the hy-
draulically fractured well gave a failure of 8.5E−20 for the packer leak
and 3.3E−19 for the tubing leak. These probability of failure outcomes
are very similar across the waste injection well and the hydraulically
fracturedwell using theprobabilisticmethod and fuzzymethod, respec-
tively. However, due to the nature of class 1 waste, there is a require-
ment for tight regulations and oversight to maximise the reduction in
groundwater contamination due to the high consequences if this were
to occur. The consequence ofmethane gas reaching groundwater during
hydraulic fracturing is lower than class 1 waste as methane gas is tech-
nically not harmful to drinkingwater. This difference in regulation could
impact the overall probabilities and individual components. Finally, the
probabilities for class 1waste injectionwere calculated across the life of
the well whereas for the hydraulically fractured well, this was onlyTable 7
Results from the event trees, Fig. 2, indicating the different probability outcomes for poten-








Scenario 1 – Fuzzy 6.35E−6 2.17E−7 8.97E−13
– Probabilistic 1.20E−4 2.88E−9 1.44E−9
Scenario 2 Packer Fuzzy 8.53E−20 2.92E−21 1.21E−26
Packer Probabilistic 4.97E−18 1.19E−22 1.49E−23
Tubing Fuzzy 3.34E−19 1.14E−20 4.72E−26
Tubing Probabilistic 7.46E−18 1.79E−22 2.24E−23
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the overall probabilities; the longer an engineered event is occurring,
the higher the likelihood of potential contamination.
3.3. Sensitivity analysis
Results in Table 7 indicate a large difference in failure probability for
all three contamination events between scenario 1 and scenario 2 due to
less barriers in scenario 1. Production tubing is not used in scenario 1,
automatically eliminating the annulus pressure barrier. The failure prob-
ability of this pressure barrier is low at 2.6E−10 or 1.3E−9 (depending
onmethodology). Therefore, this element of the event tree has the larg-
est effect on reducing the probability of groundwater contamination.
Assuming any one of the three failure events occurs, the fuzzy
method used in this paper indicates scenario 1 has a failure probability
of 6.57E−6, and scenario 2 a failure probability of 8.82E−20 for the
packer leak and 3.45E−19 for the tubing leak. If these probabilities are
converted back to a fuzzy possibility, the values would be 0.08, 1.76E
−3, and 1.93E−3, respectively. The linguistic terminology for these
numbers fall into the category ‘Very Low’ which indicates the event is
rarely encountered, never reported or highly unlikely during the injec-
tion stage. The outputs from this model contain uncertainty based on
the fuzzy methods used, with the sensitivity analysis indicating the
top event fault tree probabilities results could have an error of several
hundred percent. However, evenwith these large errors the overall fail-
ure probabilities will still be extremely low as the magnitude will only
shift by a factor of 10, still keeping the linguistic outputs as ‘Very Low’.
The result of 6.57E−6 for a scenario 1 well relates to the case study
of a leaking well in BC, Canada which was hydraulically fractured in the
Montney formation. Within the Montney resource play, 19,337 wells
have been drilled where 26 were shown to exhibit gas migration at
the surface (Cahill et al., 2019), although the leaks could have occurred
across any stage of the wells (e.g. drilling, production, injection, aban-
donment) and it is unclear what initiated the leaks. This paper demon-
strates a risk assessment for a leak occurring at the production casing
during well injection and gives a percentage probability of 0.0006%. It
is estimated the probability of gas migration occurring in wells drilled
in BC in the Montney formation is 0.13%. Although these values are sig-
nificantly different, the reasons for gas migration to the surface are not
necessarily from thewell injection process but could have occurred dur-
ing drilling, production or abandonment. Additionally, this paper only
assesses risk of certain components failing related to well integrity but
the risk potential increases cumulatively with the addition of other
leak or migration pathways.
4. Discussion
This framework has been developed to conceptualize the migration
of gas to groundwater during the well stimulation stage of a hydrauli-
cally fractured well at different points where leaks could occur. Addi-
tionally, the individual pathways have been quantified and an overall
probability of groundwater contamination calculated based on a few
different scenarios. This has also been compared with known data on
well failures across the BC region in Canada where wells have been
drilled into the Montney formation.
The failure pathways have focused on the movement of gas along
wellbores where the integrity of cement and casings has failed. The
movement into external formations was based on a pressure differential
between the surrounding formations and the wellbore. As the well stim-
ulation stage is when the wellbore experiences the highest pressures
across the wells life cycle, it is assumed the failure of well integrity had
the highest probability of occurring compared with other potential risks
during this stage. Other more probable risks which were outside the
scope of this work would be induced seismicity from the high pressures,
leading to potentialwellbore failure or fracture propagation from induced
faults, and the spilling of chemicals used during the injection process,14leading to infiltration into groundwater. The same methods as used in
this paper can be taken for assessing these pathways to groundwater con-
tamination which can provide a holistic understanding of many risks
leading to groundwater contamination during well stimulation.
This model has taken a deterministic approach whereby it is as-
sumed the process of injection has been 4 h and the failure of compo-
nents leading to migration is within this timeframe. The model
assumed once gas reached the external surroundings it would reach
groundwater at some point in time, leading to the potential for contam-
ination. This would be the case if the leak occurred at geological zone C.
The movement of gas from the external formation upwards to an aqui-
fer has not been quantifiedwithin themodel as it is outside the scope of
this work, but this can be added as a pathway to the event tree with a
quantifiable probability of failure.
When compared to existing methods, the new framework has the
following key advantages:
1. Somepublished quantitativemodels on onshore hydraulic fracturing
focus on one specific pathway which requires heavy computational
modelling to achieve a desired output with a degree of uncertainty.
This is an inefficient process for understanding the magnitude of
gas migration during hydraulic fracturing and the models are not
clearly broken down into independent failure events to understand
where the highest risk events occur. This new framework relies on
qualitatively understanding all pathways which can lead to ground-
water contamination and applying a variety of quantitative tech-
niques to evaluate the magnitude of their failures, depending on
the available data. The quantification of each event can be easily up-
dated depending on the conceptual qualitative model without the
need for heavy computation.
2. Other published quantitativemodels require less heavy computation
but rely on historic data for a specific site to determine a probability
of failure. This does not allow for a generic framework and none of
these models have been shown to be applicable to other sites across
the world. This framework has shown its applicability to two very
different sites in the UK and Canada without the reliance on historic
data. When developing a technique in a new area, such as the UK,
historic data cannot be relied upon and hence generic models and
frameworks are a requirement. This paper does not rely on the use
of historic data but has used what is available to help compare the
outputs from the fuzzy model. However, once trust exists in the
model, this data is not required.
3. Qualitativemodels have been a useful tool in developing generic legis-
lation and government guidelines for new onshore hydraulic fractur-
ing sites, but these models do not allow a quantitative understanding
of certain risks which the public and society see as essential to their
wellbeing. This new framework presents a qualitative conceptual un-
derstanding of risk pathways but applies quantitative analysis for an
improved understanding of risk to the water environment during hy-
draulic fracturing and can equally be applied to measure the risk to al-
ternative receptors such as air quality, ecology and humans.
The key disadvantages of the method are as follows:
1. Incorporating fuzzy logic is a useful method for a lack of data in the
oil and gas industry andwhere numerical data cannot replace invalu-
able expert opinion. However, the method originates amongst some
subjectivity where large differences in opinion can exist amongst ex-
perts. This is partly resolved using the weighting system but there
also exists subjectivity in the selection of weighting factors. Validat-
ing the method is a challenge to demonstrate without numerical
data to compare against the expert opinions but has been shown to
work well in this paper where there has been a clear comparison of
FFTA versus FTA.
2. As is particularly the case for the UK hypothetical well, it is more of a
challenge for experts tomake intuitive decisions on potential failures
in cement without a more detailed analysis on subsurface strata,
including pressure measurements of important formations. Data
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the accuracy of their decisions. Additionally, a deeper understanding
of cement failure in general is required to extend the fault trees and
with this, cement failure data can help to validate the fault tree
outputs.
5. Conclusions
This paper presents a new framework for the quantitative assess-
ment of risk of groundwater contamination from well integrity failure
during hydraulic fracturing. This paper has focused on a crucial stage
of hydraulic fracturing, well injection, but the framework can be easily
applied to other stages during hydraulic fracturing.
The new risk framework was successfully applied to a hydraulically
fractured well in BC, Canada, and a hypothetical construction in the UK.
Based on the results obtained, the following keyfindings are summarised:
1. The new framework successfully combines the use of probabilistic
failure rates and fuzzy logic to handle analysis with areas of high
data certainty and those severely lacking data. ETA allows amore rig-
orous analysis of the pathways for contamination to occur and high-
lights where improved data collection is required. This framework
allowed the quantification of three potential events leading to
groundwater contamination during well injection with a novel idea
of adding improved representation of failure by incorporating the
quantification of cement failure using fuzzy logic, a topic severely
lacking in data.
2. The fuzzy logicmodel used to combat the lack of data on cement failure
was applied to cement crack propagation in both the horizontal and
vertical directions to account for gasmigrating either up awell annulus
or horizontally into the surrounding formations. The challenges in ex-
pressing cement failures in the industry was overcome in this paper
by incorporating experts to use linguistic descriptors to describe indi-
vidual failure basic events as opposed to numerical values. The fuzzy
logic method handled appropriately the quantification of human
error and the results from the cement FFTA highlighted the importance
of cement selection and the full removal ofmudcuttings duringdrilling.
3. A novel aspect of this paper directly compared FFTA with conven-
tional FTA using the same pressure fault tree to demonstrate and val-
idate the strength of using fuzzy logic when suitable. The outputs
from this comparison identified a similarly low final probability
value from both methods, supporting the use of FFTA as a viable al-
ternative for conventional FTA. Additionally, it was noted the fuzzy
method allows an individual analysis of each human error based on
real life experiences compared with a probabilistic analysis, and
therefore is able to calculate a more accurate representation of
human error. This novel comparison highlights the importance of
combining fuzzy logic inputs, where human error plays a large part,
with accurate probabilistic values to improve the accuracy of the
overall probability failure.
Future work will focus on extending the framework for application
to other stages of the well such as production or abandonment, where
an understanding of logical failure events exists. An aggregative analysis
of all stages from site setup to abandonment will serve a more accurate
picture of the risks to groundwater over the lifetime of a well during hy-
draulic fracturing. Following this, the framework can be used to analyse
more complex events which could occur during well injection. These
events could involve induced seismicity caused by well stimulation
leading to wellbore failure or fracture propagation caused by well stim-
ulation, both of which could lead to gasmigration. Aggregating all these
events can produce a more holistic risk assessment across this stage of
fracturing and equally be applied to the other stages. The work pre-
sented in this paper is conceptual but allows clear development for fur-
ther research and development in the area of hydraulic fracturing and
other subsurface activities.15Notation
BC British Columbia
BCOGC British Columbia Oil and Gas Commission
EIA Environmental Impact Assessment
ERA Environmental Risk Assessment
ETA Event Tree Analysis
FFTA Fuzzy Fault Tree Analysis
FP Formation Pressure
FPS Fuzzy Possibility Score
FTA Fault Tree Analysis
FWI Fuzzy Weighted Index
MCS Minimal Cut-sets
SAM Similarity Aggregation Methodology
WP Wellbore Pressure
QRA Quantitative Risk Assessment
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